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The purpose of this presentation is three-fold: 
1/ to demonstrate that by drawing on an extension of Quine’s Method of Ontological Commitment (Quine 1948) 
promulgated by Janssen-Lauret (2014) who has shown that Quine’s original approach is problematic in that it 
proscribes the use of first-personal methods, we can illuminate, albeit briefly, the Indispensability of the Self as 
an Explanatory Entity in Contemporary Psychology 
2/ to provide examples drawn from Developmental Psychology and Social Psychology (generally neglected 
areas of Psychology by analytical philosophers who tend to focus more on the empirical work of Cognitive 
Psychologists) which demonstrate the very frequent reference to the Self, clearly understood as the referent to 
the first-personal pronoun, ascribing to it uniquely psychological, social and interpersonal as well as physical 
properties. 
3/ to point to the non-Physicalist, non-reductionist, indeed Substance Dualist conclusion that the referent of the 
first-person pronoun “I” is indispensably used in Contemporary Psychology, and most explicitly in 
Developmental and Social Psychology, and thus should be best understood as a fully-fledged entity: a Self. 
Quine’s theory of Ontological Commitment, extended to the First Person 
We have previously offered the following in Tucson in relation to Quine’s Method of Ontological 
Commitment (Bleau & Janssen-Lauret, 2014): “Quine’s strictly third-personal methodology 
entails that he cannot countenance any use of introspective data in science, but scientists 
working in psychology and psychiatry have now mostly renounced this behaviouristic impulse 
and are open to non-behaviourist methodology (Miller 2003). Introspection yields first-personal 
beliefs about the subject’s own current mental states, usually by immediate privileged access. 
The science of psychology has a need for self-reports which are introspective in that sense, 
and for grammatical differentiation between self and other. For example, first-personal 
judgments are reliably remembered even by patients with severe Alzheimer’s (Klein, et al, 
2003), and attitude surveys use first-personal self-reports as their primary kind of evidence 
(Sirken, et al, 1999).”   
 
Furthermore, we say that contra the majority of contemporary analytical philosophers who are 
committed to Physicalism (Bourget & Chalmers, 2014) and contra both Hood (2012) and 
Baggini (2013) given that we object to their implicit Physicalist question-begging discourse, we 
promise an a posteriori argument against physicalism, arguing that the use of first-personal 
methods employed in Contemporary Psychology cannot be subsumed under Physics in any 
principled way. (More detail is spelled out in Janssen-Lauret & Bleau, forthcoming: The 
Indispensable Self).  We will argue from a naturalist stance for ontological commitment to an 
entity, which is not an Immortal Soul, but rather a Self, a thing in itself, which is a 
Psychological Substance (Bleau, 2012, 2013, after Lowe, 1996, 2008). 
 
4.	  
Developmental Psychology 
Most developmental psychologists make either implicit or explicit use of the term 
Self to refer to the self, and do so often in relation to the other.  We claim that 
these very well respected scientists, such as John Bowlby, 1988 (A Secure 
Base: parent-child attachment and healthy human development) and Fonagy, et 
al 2005 (Affect regulation, mentalization and the development of Self), make 
indispensable use of Self in their empirical work (albeit that they may refer 
interchangeably to Self and Sense of Self).  It is not clear that talk of Self is to be 
explained away by showing that the putative entity is a mere façon de parler, or 
that its referent is brain/body/cluster of physical properties. 
Social Psychology 
Social psychology as a sub-discipline of Psychology is replete with theories 
which utilise Self, and some well-known examples are Self-Regulation theory 
(Baumeister, et al, 1994) and Social Identity theory (Haslam, 2014, Landmark 
Article, British Journal of Social Psychology).  These theories make 
indispensable use of Self, it is quite evident.  The authors vary in terms of their 
explicit metaphysical commitments, and we speculate that this is because they 
may differ in their need to ponder the implicit ontological claims of their theories 
and empirical practice. 
5.	  
6.	  
7.	  
Concluding Remarks 
How the so-called mental relates to the so-called physical, has long been a problem for philosophers 
of mind, and at this point in history they tend to favour the Physicalist position. We assert that with the 
ascendency of neuroscience, the recent rise of behavioural economics and the supremacy of physics, 
the worry is that the individual, qua individual is lost.  We are committed to arguing for the rightful 
ontological commitments of Contemporary Psychologists and are working on a much more detailed 
account (Janssen-Lauret & Bleau, forthcoming: The Indispensable Self). 
 
We hope to provide pause for the 56.5% of the representative sample of contemporary philosophers 
who endorse Physicalism by drawing their attention to the ontological commitments of contemporary 
Developmental and Social Psychologists.   
 
Using an extended version of Quine’s Method of Ontological Commitment we assert that current  
scientific research in Psychology is best understood as relying on the existence of selves, or agents, 
conceived as irreducibly non-physical substances in two distinct ways: a/ its rejection of the 
behaviourist paradigm, and inclusion of first personal methods and b/ advances in the theory and 
empirical practice of Developmental and Social Psychology. #PhysicalismIsFalse. 
 
 
(#PhysicalismIsFalse) 
3.	  
2.	  
  Presented at the TSC 2015 Conference, 10 June 2015 Helsinki, Finland 
The majority of analytical philosophers are 
Physicalists 
Bourget & Chalmers (2014) have reported that, of 
a contemporary representative sample of 
analytical philosophers they surveyed in late 2009 
(N=931), 56.5% endorsed a commitment to 
Physicalism (and 27.1% Non Physicalism; 16.4% 
Other).  
 
Physicalism is the thesis that everything is 
physical, or somehow “supervenes” on the 
physical.  Supervenience refers to a type of 
relation said to exist between properties at 
different levels. The claim of Physicalists is that 
mental properties purportedly “reduce” ultimately 
to physical properties and one way of describing 
this relation is to refer to it as supervenience. 
 
In this Poster Sketch we reflect on the sociological 
fact that this majority endorsement of Physicalism 
by contemporary philosophers is out of kilter with 
the implicit ontological commitments of 
contemporary psychologists and propose this fact 
alone may be reason for philosophers to have 
pause to reconsider their “majority” commitment to 
Physicalism.   Albeit that the terms mind and soul 
are largely taken to be co-referential since 
Descartes; here, we focus on Self.   
 
  
 
Some neuroscientists and philosophers claim the Self is an “illusion” 
Although some neuroscientists and philosophers want to claim that the Self is an 
illusion of sorts, e.g. Hood (2012), The Self Illusion, and Baggini (2013), The Ego Trick; 
this claim seems to us to be manifestly false.  Both these books are entertaining to 
read, however they make claims about the Self which appear unmerited. Baggini, p 
263, says “The Ego Trick is not to persuade us that we exist when we do not, but to 
make us believe we are more substantial and enduring than we really are.” 
Hood, loc 124, Kindle Edition says, “In the same way that we can see a square at the 
centre of the arrangement in Figure 1, it is an illusion created by the surrounding 
elements. Take the context away, and the square disappears. In the same way, the self 
is an illusion created by our brain.” 
There doesn’t seem good reason to believe that we are not “substantial” (Baggini, 
Philosopher) nor that the self is “an illusion created by our brain.” (Hood, 
Neuroscientist).  
1.	  
